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Abstract
In the last decades, new technologies have improved the survival of patients affected 
by chronic illnesses. Among them, left ventricular assist device (LVAD) has repre-
sented a viable solution for patients with advanced heart failure (HF). Even though 
the LVAD prolongs life expectancy, patients’ vulnerability generally increases dur-
ing follow up and patients’ request for the device withdrawal might occur. Such a 
request raises some ethical concerns in that it directly hastens the patient’s death. 
Hence, in order to assess the ethical acceptability of LVAD withdrawal, we ana-
lyse and examine an ethical argument, widely adopted in the literature, that we call 
the “descriptive approach”, which consists in giving a definition of life-sustaining 
treatment to evaluate the ethical acceptability of treatment withdrawal. Focusing 
attention on LVAD, we show criticisms of this perspective. Finally, we assess every 
patient’s request of LVAD withdrawal through a prescriptive approach, which finds 
its roots in the criterion of proportionality.
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Preliminary Framework
Over the last century, technological advancement has given birth to ethical con-
cerns over the role of téchne in clinical practice and the emergence of ethical 
implications of its utilization in end-of-life issues.
Chronic illnesses, the most predominant in contemporary clinical practice 
(Milani and Lavie 2015), are more challenging than acute diseases because they 
require ongoing therapy until the very end of life. In such clinical cases, patients 
live in a permanent pathological state of deficiency that they must learn to live 
with.
Advanced heart failure represents one of the major chronic pathophysiologies 
against which technological advancement tries to fight. According to the Ameri-
can Heart Association, heart disease remains the first cause of death in United 
States of America (USA).
According to the National Health and Nutrition Examination Survey (NAH-
NES), the 2018 report of the American Heart Association (Benjamin et al. 2018) 
observed that 6.5 million adult Americans suffered from heart failure (HF) from 
2011 to 2014; this result represented a significant increase as the same statistics, 
for the 2009 to 2012 period, showed that less than 6 million people—just under 
5.9 million US adults—suffered from HF.
As the number of patients with HF continues to rise in contrast to that of 
donors available for heart transplant, and as the time spent on waiting list is 
unpredictable, clinical development in mechanical circulatory support (MCS) 
devices represents an important contribution for patients’ survival (Stewart and 
Givertz 2012; Burkhoff et al. 2015).
The structure of support devices has improved significantly and the new gen-
eration of left ventricular assist devices (LVADs), the most common in current 
clinical practice (Eisen 2019), has become less troublesome for recipients (Stew-
art and Givertz 2012). In short, as the Eighth Interagency Registry for Mechani-
cally Assisted Circulatory Support (INTERMACS) annual report shows, the 
development in technological circulatory support has constituted an innovative 
alternative for patients suffering from heart failure, reducing adverse effects, 
improving life expectancy and patients’ overall quality of life (Kirklin et al. 2017; 
Mancini and Colombo 2015).
What is a LVAD and Why This Implant Raises Ethical Concerns
Left ventricular assist devices (LVAD) are mechanical pumps that replace the 
pumping function of the left ventricle to push blood into the aorta and maintain 
an adequate blood flow. Unlike the first LVADs, the new generation LVADs are 
surgically implanted into the chest of the patient and connected to an external 
controller which functions through a power source that must be recharged elec-
trically, either with batteries or with an outlet. Supplying the function of the left 
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ventricle, LVADs can be adopted for the management of advanced heart failure 
through four different strategies: bridge to transplant (BTT), bridge to candi-
dacy (BTC), bridge to recovery (BTR) and destination therapy (DT) (Stewart and 
Givertz 2012; Smith et  al. 2015). Unlike the first three strategies, belonging to 
the category of “temporary circulatory devices”, DT LVAD implants are more 
challenging and harder to manage. In such circumstances, the device is a viable, 
long-term support solution for patients ineligible for transplant because of their 
physical limitations. The device represents a sort of “extraordinary” opportunity 
for patients exposed to the risk of imminent death; however, the period after the 
implant is described as a “liminal state” (Standing et  al. 2017), during which 
recipients feel neither healthy nor critically ill (Barg et al. 2017).
Unlike the BTT strategy, even though patients in DT feel grateful for hav-
ing been selected as good candidates, they generally express a lack of choice 
and powerlessness due to their double dependence on the machine and on their 
caregiver, the significant and permanent lifestyle trade-offs during the follow-
up phase (Rady and Verheijde 2014) and the myriad of collateral effects, such 
as infections, bleeding, device malfunctions, stroke and multi-organ failure that 
could trouble the patient’s conditions (Kirklin et al. 2017). This explains why the 
worsening of LVAD patients’ quality of life may incite their eventual request for 
the deactivation of the device (Rady and Verheijde 2014; Rizzieri et al. 2008).
The ethical acceptability of LVAD deactivation is being challenged because of 
the meaning attributed to the perfusion it produces. After the implant, the continuity 
of blood perfusion is guaranteed by the mechanical pump. In fact, although the DT 
LVAD is first to “support” the left heart chamber, once implanted, it soon replaces 
the native function of the ventricle, maintaining an adequate blood pressure for the 
rest of the body. Since any cardiac device such as LVAD, pacemaker and implant-
able cardioverter-defibrillator (ICD) has its own function and mechanism, end-of-
life trajectories vary depending on the partial or complete perfusion of the device 
implanted, complicating end-of-life decision making (Rady and Verheijde 2014). 
Thus, it is fundamental to highlight that both collateral events after the withdrawal 
and the length of the dying process depend on the nature of the device implanted.
In the particular case of patients with a DT LVAD implant, the native organ does 
not function on its own even though still has its place in the chest, to such an extent 
that the patient, without an LVAD, could die. The dying process lasts from 20 min-
utes up to 48 hours.
In this sense, we can argue that the LVAD is a full life-saving support, just like 
any transplanted organ is. The patient wholly depends on its activation, just as any 
transplanted patient depends on their new perfused heart. Therefore, the patient’s 
request to deactivate an LVAD raises delicate issues concerning end-of-life trajecto-
ries and decisions.
Based on these observations, it will be necessary to understand whether the with-
drawal of the LVAD is deemed an act morally equated to “killing” (Marin 2017; 
Bramstedt and Wenger 2001; Kini and Kirkpatrick 2013).
In order to pursue this line of thought, it is essential to shift from a descriptive 
level to a prescriptive one. The descriptive approach consists in giving a definition 
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to the notion of “life-saving treatment” in order to justify whether a LVAD, accord-
ing to its definition, might be switched off and in what circumstances this might be 
conceived as an act of euthanasia.1
Should the internality-externality argument make deactivation ethically accepta-
ble? In other words, should the structural composition of a medical device influence 
the decision to end the patient’s life? Might a normative assertion on withdrawal 
derive from a descriptive assertion over the structural definition of a treatment?
The analysis will shift to the normative approach, once the impasse of the 
“descriptive approach” is demonstrated. Reconsidering the notion of “futility” by 
Pellegrino, the criterion of proportionality will be explored with the goal of under-
standing in which circumstances it will be ethically acceptable to turn a LVAD off 
and how such a criterion legitimates the choice to deactivate the device when the 
burdens outweigh the benefits, allowing the patient die in dignity.
The Descriptive Approach
The Internality–Externality Dualism: The Hybrid Composition of LVAD
The first binary definition, which can be found in the literature to define a life-sus-
taining treatment, concerns the distinction between internal and external devices. 
The existing difference between the internal and the external composition of the 
structure of a treatment comes from the fact that a device, according to its mechani-
cal structure, might be objectively considered as an internal or an external part of 
the body itself (Sulmasy 2007; Jansen 2006).
The notion of “internal” treatment indicates that a medical treatment is located 
internally, becoming a new integrated part of the organism, that is, an integrated 
part of the self much as any transplanted organ. The LVAD, in fact, is partially inter-
nal since it is surgically implanted into the chest, constituting an ancillary support 
for the heart. In the paper “Doctor, will you turn off my LVAD?”, Simon (2008) 
explains that, besides the external controller, the LVAD is “an integrated part of an 
independent functioning organism” (p. 14). Since it completely fulfils the perfusion 
of the native heart internally, its activation implies the support of the patients’ func-
tional organism, becoming a new part of the body. Considered as internal and inte-
gral as the heart, its integration is a condition that does not allow the deactivation of 
the device.
On the other hand, the concept of “external treatment” states that a clinical 
therapy is located outside the patient’s body and that it does not belong to the 
self: there is no integration between the therapeutic option and the body, no 
1 The starting point of our analysis follows the line of the work realized by Felicitas Kraemer, over the 
“ontological approach” (Kraemer 2013) for the justification of any treatment withdrawal. For the author, 
the term “ontology” is used to define a LVAD, that is, to answer the question “What is a LVAD?”. Since 
the concept of “ontology”— which corresponds to the philosophical discipline studying the metaphysi-
cal structure of the “to be”—might be misleading whenever facing issues related to clinical ethics, a 
“descriptive approach” may be more appropriate.
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effective physical interaction. The body defines its physical boundaries and treat-
ment is conceived as an “outsider”. In other words, the externality of therapeu-
tic treatment does not directly affect the patient’s body as a transplanted organ 
does. Unlike Simon’s position, Fischbach (2008) argues that since LVAD is not 
an internal organ, its maintenance requires an ongoing external engagement both 
for patients and caregivers. This implies that, in accordance with externality, the 
LVAD may be switched off.
The structure of a LVAD is different from other life-sustaining treatments. 
LVAD has a hybrid composition (Kraemer 2013) as it is partly inside the body—
the mechanical pump is surgically implanted into the chest and a tube is internally 
connected to the left ventricle to push blood into the aorta—and partly outside 
the patient’s body—it is connected via cord to an external computer that has to be 
recharged electrically. Because the LVAD is neither a completely external treatment 
(e.g., mechanical ventilation), nor a completely internal one (e.g., pacemakers), the 
argument of the “internal/external” dualism would not be consistent and sufficient 
to justify the acceptability of LVAD deactivation: its hybrid composition places the 
device in an “in-between” space where the boundaries between “internality” and 
“externality” are undefined. The patient, while looking in the mirror, sees the con-
troller and the batteries that allow the pump to function. On the one hand, this sort 
of “in-betweenness” and limbo does not make the patient feel free and independent 
from the external source. On the other hand, the mechanical pump implanted into 
the chest is what makes the patient feel still alive, despite its partial externality. The 
feeling of being always in a “liminal space” (Barg et al. 2017) does not always help 
the patient understand what the LVAD is for her/him; that is, its meaning in the con-
struction of her/his personal identity after the implant.
At present, bioengineering has not succeeded in developing either a totally inter-
nal LVAD, or a completely internal Total Artificial Heart (TAH); that is probably 
due to the presence of both a controller and a power supply (i.e., batteries), which 
are too large to be implanted in the body. But if one day the total implantation were 
possible, thereby overcoming the complexities of the hybrid composition of MCS, 
should we equate LVAD withdrawal with an injection of KCI (potassium chloride) 
for the discontinuation of the transplanted heart on the base of the “internality the-
sis”? Should the two acts be considered acts of euthanasia?
Following the Sulmasy’s definition (Sulmasy 2007, p. 70), “killing” constitutes 
“an act in which an agent performs an action that creates a new, nontherapeutic, 
lethal, pathophysiological state in a human being with the intention of causing that 
human being’s death”. It is possible to notice that according to such a notion, as the 
author continues, there would be no difference in the result between the deactivation 
of an internal and of an external treatment, e.g., between an injection of KCI to stop 
a transplanted heart and an internal device deactivation: both result in the patient’s 
death. However, if the former produces an act which introduces directly a new lethal 
pathophysiology accelerating the process of death, the latter allows the cardiac dis-
ease affecting the patient to run its course until the end.
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The Second Dualism: The Distinction Between “Replacement” and “Substitute” 
Treatments
Unlike the “internality vs. externality” thesis, the present differentiation focuses 
more on the functions that a treatment fulfils, rather than on its mechanical structure 
(internal or external).
Contrary to acute diseases that can be cured with “regulatory treatment”, helping 
the body to re-establish its haemostatic equilibrium regulating a particular function 
of the organism through external or internal administration, the so called “constitu-
tive therapies” provide a function that the body cannot fulfil by itself (Rady and 
Verheijde 2014). Two kinds of life sustaining treatments belong to such a category: 
the replacement treatment and the substitute treatment. The former states a medical 
therapy completely replaces an organ function, e.g., a transplanted heart. Put dif-
ferently and as Sulmasy explains (Sulmasy 2007), replacement therapy provides a 
function that was lost in the organism because of the progress of the disease. Rady 
and Verheijde (2014, p. 6) list the main elements of replacement therapy, such as 
“responsiveness to changes in the organism, properties as growth and self-repair, 
independence from external electrical source, independence from the external con-
trol of an expert, immunological compatibility and physical integration into the 
patient’s body.”
According to this definition, replacement treatment, such as a cardiac transplant, 
is totally integrated into how the organism functions: it responds to its needs and is 
embodied in its metabolic changes. The act of withdrawing a replacement treatment 
directly interrupts the organic integration of the treatment in the organism, produc-
ing a new lethal pathophysiology, thus harming the patient and hastening the pro-
cess of death (Sulmasy 2007).
The withdrawal would correspond to an intrusive action, compromising the 
patient’s well-being and the clinical effectiveness of the treatment itself.
On the other hand, Rady and Verheijde define substitute treatment, e.g., a car-
diac device, in the following terms: it is a permanent replacement of a native physi-
ological body function, with continuous control of electrical functions of the heart; 
it is integrated in the patient’s body and immunological system, responding to all its 
changing demands; moreover, if respondent to the body changes, these devices are 
dependent on an electrical source and on the physician’s judgment. In other words, 
by substituting for the native function of the heart, cardiac device deactivation deter-
mines the gradual cessation of circulation, respiration and consciousness.
In the paper by Rady and Verheijde (2014), it is essential to underline that as 
opposed to replacement therapy, substitute treatment is completely dependent on an 
electronic source and on the judgment of an expert. During the follow up with a 
LVAD, batteries have to be changed or recharged every 8 to 12 hours by caregivers 
and the controller has to be monitored both by patients, caregivers and MCS clini-
cians of the LVAD centre, in the aim to verify the occurrence of unexpected abnor-
malities, device malfunctions or collateral effects. Whenever the patient expresses 
sickness in handling the everyday difficulties of the implant, the request to deacti-
vate the device might arise.
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Even though the LVAD becomes the condition sine qua non the patient would 
die, it is evident that mechanical circulatory supports do not cure patients from the 
underlining heart diseases (Bramstedt 2003a,b). On the contrary, the mechanical cir-
culatory devices only support the pathological state replacing the pumping function 
of the native heart. That means that the pathological state does not disappear with 
the treatment itself because it does not constitute a complete cure.
Going back to Sulmasy’s definition of “killing” (Sulmasy 1998), the discontinua-
tion of a “replacement treatment”, which has become an integrated biological part of 
the body itself, necessarily introduces a new lethal pathophysiology, leading to the 
patient’s death. Whereas, “allowing to die” indicates the act of removing a treatment 
for the pre-existing disorder or the renunciation to start a therapy.
With regard to the withdrawal of substitute treatments, consider two different sce-
narios that might concern a DT LVAD implant:
- The first has to do with the interruption of a LVAD whose burdens and collat-
eral effects become so significant during the follow up phase that the patient is not 
able to handle everyday life with the device. On the one hand, treatment deactivation 
might produce some clinical consequences, which the palliative care team is called 
to deal with, on the other hand, once the LVAD is switched off, the patient’s death 
is principally determined by the previous pathological state and the several burdens 
perceived during the therapy. In other words, when the treatment becomes ineffec-
tive and disproportionate to the benefits, deactivation allows the death process to 
follow its natural course.
- The second scenario concerns the case of a patient with a DT LVAD, who is not 
significantly suffering from the collateral effects produced by the implant and who is 
not at risk of imminent death. Should the patient’s request to switch the LVAD off be 
respected? Are there any other factors to take into consideration for the clinicians to 
accept such a request?
This second scenario challenges the possibility to withdraw the implant in that 
collateral effects do not particularly affect the patient and the clinical conditions are 
stable. In this kind of scenario, it is fundamental to realize an assessment of all the 
factors that could play a role in the patient’s choice, e.g., depressive symptoms, psy-
chiatric diseases, feelings and changing perceptions about the DT LVAD, a good 
relation with a caregiver who takes care of the patient after hospitalisations. There-
fore, it is fundamental to identify the circumstances in which the LVAD is effec-
tively disproportionate for the patients’ conditions from the situations in which the 
request is expressed when the pathological state is not progressing, and the patient is 
not facing death. In the second case, if the request is accepted with no opposition or 
discussion between clinicians, patients, and families, the interruption of the therapy 
risks being conceived as a patient-assisted-death (PAD) (Rady and Verheijde 2014). 
The second scenario evidently leads us to consider the fact that the patient’s stable 
condition is guaranteed by LVAD perfusion. This argument shows that the definition 
of substitute treatments is not always fit to ethically justify every deactivation of the 
support device; on the contrary, it will be fundamental to analyse circumstances and 
variables on a case-by-case basis.
In fact, heart transplant differs from a mechanical device primarily because of 
its “natural biofixture” (Rizzieri 2008; Paola and Walker 2000), replacing the 
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pathologic native heart with a new healthy organ. A LVAD does not physically 
replace the native heart but supports it by pumping blood and substituting its lost 
pathologic function. Ultimately a transplant and a LVAD deliver the same result, 
maintaining the heart working and preserving life.
What emerges from this parallelism is that even though in both cases life is lit-
erally sustained by the medical treatment, the former is closer to the “naturality” 
of the native heart, while the second supports the hemodynamic functions of the 
native heart “from the outside”. This kind of distinction may be equivocal in that it 
suggests that transplants completely cure the patient. On the contrary, as Bramstedt 
suggests, 
heart transplants (allografts) are not seen as curing heart disease but a ther-
apeutic intervention in the larger picture of the health of the cardiovascular 
system. Heart disease processes can still occur after allograft transplantation. 
Refusing re-transplantation or other interventions can be viewed as allowing 
the underlying cardiac disease process to take its course to death (Bramstedt 
2004, p. 427).
Bramstedt’s assertion is partly sharable because heart disease may also occur after 
the transplant and is not limited to the heart but involves the entire cardiovascular 
system. Moreover, rejection episodes may occur because of other collateral factors, 
directly linked to the immunosuppressant therapy.
In heart transplantation, the assessment of proportionality is realized before the 
transplant, during the patients’ selection for transplantation (Lampert and Ramani 
2017). Even though the patient may be affected by rejection episodes, personality 
disorders, depressive symptoms, distortion of the self and psychological difficulties 
in managing the changes of identity, the health care team aims at preventing organ 
rejection and relapse during the follow up (Kraemer 2013). Literature illustrates 
the difficulty patients face in accepting a new organ, that is, an outsider; however, 
this feeling of strangeness does not generally lead to the request of organ withdrawal 
(Wilhelm 2013). This act is not even conceived since it corresponds to a clinically 
invasive surgery leading directly the patient’s death. Such an act, in fact, is against 
good clinical practice, harming the patient and involving the patient’s death inten-
tionally. As Sulmasy argues (1998, 2007), respecting the patient’s request to with-
draw a replacement treatment, like a transplanted heart, is morally illicit and con-
stitutes an act of killing because, unsupported by any clinical conditions, it would 
produce a new and lethal pathophysiology. Instead of asking to have the heart 
removed, the patient might let himself/herself die, for example, by ending immuno-
suppressant therapy.
Unlike heart transplantation, however, patients’ conditions with LVAD may 
worsen not only because of the underlying cardiac disease but also because of the 
unforeseeable collateral events, also related to the cardiovascular system, which may 
have an important impact on patients’ end-of-life trajectories, deteriorating their 
course of life. Thus, like in the first scenario, the deterioration of the clinical picture 
may influence patients’ values and preferences in their end-of-life, leading them to 
request the LVAD to be switched off.
Is “artificiality” the criterion for the ethical acceptability of LVAD withdrawal?
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In order to override the impasse of the descriptive level, the distinction between 
“natural” and “artificial” may represent the binary pair at the base of the incoher-
ence of the two above-mentioned dualisms (internal vs. external devices; replace-
ment vs. substitute treatments). In fact, even though some studies use the notion 
of “biofixture” in order to state a sort of belonging of a device integrated in the 
patient’s body (Paola and Walker 2000; Kramer et al. 2010; Jansen 2006; Sulmasy 
2007), it is essential to re-evaluate the concept of “nature” and “artificial” and the 
role it may have in the decision to deactivate a treatment.
The notion of “nature” has progressively changed its meaning in relation to the 
empowerment of technical progress. If we took the Aristotelian teleological con-
ception of “nature”2 as the principle with its own movement, while the “artificial” 
as the product of an external force that interrupts the course of nature and its inter-
nal organization, it would be legitimate to assert that every outcome of the medical 
téchne is both a distortion of nature itself—a deviation from the natural course of 
human life, incapable of overriding illnesses by itself—and the effort to preserve 
human existence.
The empowerment of téchne has completely changed the teleological perspec-
tive of nature, as a normative process of self-handling. The progress of bioengineer-
ing and the technological imperative have, therefore, modified the conception over 
the notion of human nature and the management of human lives in the healthcare 
setting.
It is fundamental here to make a distinction introduced by Robert Spaemann 
(2002).
For the German philosopher, there exists a substantial difference between being 
a nature and having a nature: the former indicates the ontological structure of a par-
ticular reality, the internal principle determining the definition of “being human”; in 
the particular case of the human being, as Kant suggests (Kant 2011) this principle 
is dignity, which distinguishes human beings from objects that have a price; the lat-
ter, having a nature, comparable to the Kantian “material” definition of nature, rep-
resents everything that can be an object of experience through reason, i.e., the total-
ity of phenomena. Therefore, it is because we are a particular nature, e.g., humanity, 
that we all have a nature, e.g., reason. Thus, as Spaeman argues, nature should be 
defined as both the condition and the content of human freedom, which accom-
plishes itself through reason.
Having a nature, as an expression of human reasoning, has progressively changed 
its meaning, becoming a disposition for the domination of nature through human 
reasoning itself: far from indicating the innate tension for the contemplation of truth, 
as Plato suggests in his philosophical dialogues, human reasoning has turned into 
instrumental rationality, as well-explained by Adorno and Horkheimer (2002).
2 The adjective “teleological” derives from the two Greek notions of “telos” (end, purpose) and “logos” 
(reasons, explanation, argument) and literally indicates the “explanation over the end”. Aristotle is one of 
the first pioneers of natural teleology which consists in asserting that every change has its own principle 
and end in nature itself.
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This technical rationality has affected the empowerment of the medical settings: 
the human body is a machine to be controlled in order to prevent the progression of 
illnesses.
It is evident that, on the one hand, the technological imperative answers the need 
to cure patients and, on the other hand, bioethics progressively focuses the attention 
on the importance of caring for them. Treatment withdrawal is an evident manifesta-
tion of clinicians’ caring approach whenever no cure might accomplish the objective 
of restoring health.
Mechanical devices and organ transplantations are two examples of such a techni-
cal intervention in medicine. Neither the former nor the latter can be considered a 
natural process of re-establishing health: both heart transplants and cardiac devices 
are the result of the empowerment of medical science; that is, each is a direct mani-
festation of the interruption of the natural course of life, whenever it is affected by 
illness, in order to preserve it.
Moreover, the notion of replacement treatment, e.g., cardiac transplant, refers to 
“the responsiveness of a treatment to changes in the organism” (Rady and Verhei-
jde 2014): in transplantations, responsiveness to the organism is also determined by 
the immunosuppressive therapy, which is a fundamental condition for the patient’s 
outcome in the follow up. This claim aims at emphasizing that cardiac transplant 
depends on the immunosuppressive therapy as well as on a healthy diet and appro-
priate conduct, even if it replaces the native organ. This means that “external” fac-
tors are fundamental to the patient’s outcome during follow up.
The new heart physically replaces the pathological one, but it necessarily depends 
on other external but essential conditions. Such reasoning demonstrates that just as 
cardiac transplant is not a complete replacement, because as it depends on other var-
iables, the definition of “substitute treatment” is also adequate to ethically accept the 
withdrawal of a LVAD because the device is not a complete “substitution”; there-
fore, the deactivation of the device has to be legitimated by a normative statement 
considering the factors having an impact on end-of-life cases.
The Criterion of Proportionality: How does it Provide Acceptability 
to LVAD Withdrawal?
Far from wondering whether a categorization of the LVAD, by definition, may be 
essential to ethically explain the legitimacy of deactivation, it may be more appro-
priate to reflect over the conditions implying the patient’s potential request of with-
drawal and in what circumstances physicians may accept such conditions, agreeing 
with the patient’s wish. In order to achieve this objective, it will be necessary to 
reflect upon the criterion of proportionality, considered as the rationale justifying 
the physician’s decision to interrupt treatment, and adhering to the patient’s will. 
Moreover, the explanation of this criterion will help us take a well-argued position 
in the euthanasia debate, explaining why and under which conditions LVAD with-
drawal is not an act of euthanasia.
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The notion of proportionality is not monolithic; on the contrary, it is the result of 
the assessment of a diversity of factors transcending the patient’s clinical conditions, 
but closely linked to them.
To better understand the use of this concept in clinical practice, the term medical 
futility coined by Pellegrino may be particularly relevant (Pellegrino 2000a,b, 2005).
We consider the term “futility”, as Pellegrino suggests, is a “means for prudential 
clinical judgment” and is particularly useful  to distinguish ordinary from extraor-
dinary treatments in the clinical practice. If we take prudence to mean “practical 
wisdom”—the Greek phronesis—described in the sixth book of Aristotle’s Nico-
machean Ethics, which is the human disposition to discern the good in specific and 
contextual situations, and if we translate, as Pellegrino suggests, “practical wisdom” 
into “the prudential guide to moral assessment to the good of the patient and to the 
moral permissiveness of withholding or withdrawing particular treatments in seri-
ously ill or dying patients” (Pellegrino 2000b), it is possible to claim that futility 
expresses a judgment that finds its roots in the complexities of particular dilemmatic 
circumstances on the patient’s good in end-of-life circumstances.
In his genealogy of the notion of “futility”, Pellegrino (Pellegrino 2000b) dis-
tinguishes the denotative conception of the term from its connotative value. If the 
former is used to define something that is inadequate for the expected goal, e.g., a 
particular treatment is not effective for the restoration of health, the latter is enriched 
by all the imaginative associations the term might refer to—in our specific case, a 
futile treatment might suggest the idea of the abandonment of the patient. Consider-
ing the presence of a variety of declinations of the term in daily use, Pellegrino is 
considered the father of the notion of futility in that he reviewed the concept and 
underlined the difference between its classical use and the need for an renewed 
meaning to attribute to such a notion.
In fact, past tradition translated futility from a clinical perspective. Re-proposing 
the difference between ordinary and extraordinary treatments, the notion of futility 
was generally used to indicate a therapy where pains and costs were more significant 
than benefits produced. In these circumstances, the treatment was “extraordinary” 
in that it prolonged human life and pains without an aim. Therefore, as Pope Pio 
XII suggested in a speech in 1957, in order to respect the person’s dignity, the with-
drawal of any extraordinary treatment may be considered licit. Even though at that 
time futility still maintained its technical and clinical meaning, the development of 
the movements for the recognition of the patient’s rights and the proclamation of the 
principle of autonomy as the pillar of bioethics and clinical practice have progres-
sively determined a new and different declination of the concept of futility.
In 1980, the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith published a Decla-
ration on Euthanasia where the notions of “extraordinary” and “ordinary” treatments 
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were replaced by “proportionate” and “disproportionate” means. Proportionality 
was thus conceived as a judgment realized on the basis of “the type of treatment 
to be used, its degree of complexity or risk, its cost and the possibilities of using 
it, […] comparing these elements with the result that can be expected, taking into 
account the state of the sick person and his or her physical resources” (Sacred Con-
gregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 1980).
In the light of these observations, the judgment of proportionality might be trans-
lated into Aristotelian practical wisdom, or “prudential guide” by Pellegrino at the 
base of his notion of futility.
The Vatican definition of proportionality highlights the eclectic composition of 
this judgment.
Thus, it is essential to recognize the importance of the technical role of the physi-
cian and his/her strict clinical risk–benefit ratio in the evaluation of any treatment 
effectiveness. However, this ratio alone underestimates the value and the function of 
the patient-physician relationship in identifying a good choice, especially in critical 
circumstances, such as the activation or the withdrawal of a LVAD. It is through the 
interaction between two moral agents, the patient and the physician, their life stories 
and autobiographical experiences that any clinical decision might be taken towards 
a “good decision”.
Even though Pellegrino did not directly use the notion of “proportionality”, but 
rather that of “futility”, his explanation efficiently clarifies the factors that must 
be taken into account whenever considering the appropriateness of a therapeutic 
option; these variables belong both to the clinical domain and to the patient’s world 
of values, goals and context: the first is effectiveness, the second deals with benefits, 
and the third with burdens (Pellegrino 2005; Pellegrino 2000a,b).
Effectiveness is related to the clinical sphere and consists of the physician’s abil-
ity to alter, through techno-medical expertise, the disease process: a treatment is 
effective if it clinically fulfils the desired end, that is, the patient’s well-being. Ben-
efit is more related to a subjective determination of what is good for the patient; this 
evaluation is realized by the patient, if competent, or by a valid surrogate. Unlike the 
first element, benefit is assessed based on patient’s values and goals in undergoing 
a treatment, that is, the patient’s possibility to pursue his or her life objectives. The 
third factor regards burdens, which are evaluated on the bases of physical, social, 
existential, and economic costs. Not only are objective costs decisive for such an 
evaluation; both caregivers’ and patients’ concerns are involved in order to assess if 
a treatment is futile.
It is essential to underline that effectiveness, benefits, and burdens must be 
equally considered for the assessment of the treatment’s proportionality. If the over-
all evaluation of these three factors does not respect the patient’s good, the treatment 
must be considered futile.
The same observation is realized by Fleming (2005). In his paper, futility, far 
from being conceived as an objective term based on prognosis, life expectations, and 
assessment of clinical improvements, is found as an integration of variables, which 
join both the clinical sphere of effectiveness and the patient’s world of values, pref-
erences and burdens. As Flaming explains, the content of “futility” is “moral”, more 
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than merely clinical, in that its aim is to valorise the intrinsic essence of human 
beings, that is, dignity.
Whenever a treatment becomes burdensome because its costs (not merely physi-
cal, but especially psychological, relational, and existential) overweigh its benefits, 
its application might prolong quantitative human mortal life, sustaining the biologi-
cal functioning of an organism but the patient’s body is not experiencing nor living. 
The dimension of “living” is determined by the interaction of the double dimension 
of the body, that of the “to have” and that of the “to be”3 (Merleau-Ponty 2012): 
the fact of having an exterior body with functions that still respond to the organism 
through a medical treatment might meet the “to be”, the dimension implying the 
interaction of the deeper trace of subjectivity. Therefore, if the body is conceived not 
only as what the individual has, but also the element through which the individual 
is and expresses himself/herself, we argue that any treatment, beyond the quantita-
tive prolongation of human life, has to reflect the inner desires of subjectivities, their 
perception of burdens and networks outside the hospital walls.
On the basis of this final observation, we argue that the notion of futility by Pel-
legrino is particularly relevant in that it represents the “prudential guide” (Pellegrino 
2000b) for the expression of an ethical judgment that, in end-of-life situations, helps 
the stakeholders to make a decision for the good of patients, even when this kind of 
decision implies withdrawing treatment.
The choice to shift from the notion of futility to that of proportionality is due 
to a “methodological” reason. As Pellegrino suggests too, the two concepts are 
synonyms.
However, according to our perspective, if the former refers to the process of guid-
ing the decision to make, the latter evokes the criterion based on which the explora-
tion is realized.
The criterion of proportionality is fundamental when facing ethical dilemmas for 
the deactivation of life-sustaining treatments, like LVAD.
Many collateral effects that hamper the follow up and prevent the patient from 
leading a “normal life”, bear a weight over their desire to switch a LVAD off (Arnold 
et al. 2016). The device might improve qualitatively the overall expectations of sur-
vival, but that does not constitute a guarantee. Stroke, infections, multi-organ failure, 
device malfunctions are all unpredictable collateral episodes that might aggravate 
the patient’s outcome during follow up, while prolonging life and sufferings (Rady 
and Verheijde 2014). An overall progressive deterioration of clinical health condi-
tions during the follow-up challenges the patient’s psychological stability. It also 
makes their personal life-goals uncertain, decreasing the patient’s desire to go on 
with treatment; in other words, the request for withdrawal meets clinical approval in 
that treatment is clinically ineffective and unnecessary for the patient’s physical and 
personal wellbeing, but especially disproportionate in respect to the complexity of 
the patient’s suffering. Deactivation of the device corresponds to an extreme gesture 
of care and humanity by the physicians, while also respecting the patient’s dignity, 
3 The philosophical distinction between “having a body” and “being a body” was first introduced by 
Husserl and his phenomenology and then revisited by Merleau Ponty’s Philosophy of Chair.
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that is, the intrinsic value of the person, a value that the preservation of life might 
lose when suffering and pain become burdensome (Mueller et al. 2010). Put differ-
ently, treatment withdrawal represents the practical condition for death to happen. Its 
aim is not death itself, but to allow nature to follow its own course (Sulmasy 1998), 
relieving the patient from suffering and excessive pain. This explains why LVAD 
withdrawal does not correspond to an act of killing. On the contrary, it is the evident 
recognition that the LVAD no longer fulfils its function.
In LVAD therapy, as we have already stated, clinical conditions have an impor-
tant impact, even if not an exclusive one, on the patient’s outcome during follow up, 
as clinical factors may worsen the overall conditions of the patient (physical and 
psychological), harming them and altering the proportionality of the treatment itself 
during the follow up phase both in the hospital and at home.
Differently from other kinds of life-sustaining treatment, like ICD or pacemakers, 
the boundaries defined by LVAD functions are not clear. If at first it supports the 
pumping function of the left ventricle, it progressively becomes the only condition 
for the cardiac activity. That is why the distinction between replacement and substi-
tute treatments by Sulmasy or Rady and Verheijde is not applicable for the LVAD 
activation. Sulmasy (2007), after defining “replacement” therapies as “part of the 
restored physiology of the patient” and after pointing out that the more a techno-
logical intervention is conceived as a “replacement” becoming “part of the restored 
physiology of the patient, “an integrated part of the organism”, the more the with-
drawal represents a “killing”, he explains that there exists no “absolute standard” for 
the categorization of substitute and replacement treatments. And the LVAD belongs 
to a “grey zone” in that it is “between the two”: the discontinuation of LVAD leads 
the patient’s heart failure to its natural course until death and to the progressive dete-
rioration of the other vital functions of the organism.
In the light of this observation, the request for LVAD withdrawal might not be 
ethically justified by the argument proposed by Sulmasy; it is more appropriate, in 
end-of-life situations with a DT LVAD, to assess the proportionality of the implant, 
considering treatment effectiveness, patient’s wishes and preferences, and the over-
all burdens making the therapy futile at a certain point of follow-up (McGee 2011).
Another important aspect to take into consideration when treating the ethical 
issue of treatment withdrawal has to do with the implications of the dying process. 
Since the waiting time for death after the deactivation of the device varies from 
20 minutes up to 48 hours and the arrest of circulation determines the progressive 
deterioration of vital functions, it is fundamental to guarantee the patients a conti-
nuity of care supported by the intervention of a palliative care team (Wordingham 
et al. 2017). For this reason, the International Guidelines for MCS published in 2013 
(Feldman et  al. 2013), dedicate an entire part to advance care planning, palliative 
care collaboration, and the option of deactivation. Evaluation of the appropriateness 
of deactivation must consider the possibility of several complications that might 
occur during the process leading to death; therefore, the healthcare team must ensure 
support so that patients will live the phenomenon of death as peacefully as possible.
As we suggest, proportionality is a judgment expressed by physicians taking 
into consideration treatment effectiveness, its benefits and burdens. It is a global 
judgment realized for the good of the patient. When a LVAD is no longer effective 
Content courtesy of Springer Nature, terms of use apply. Rights reserved.
339
1 3
HEC Forum (2021) 33:325–343 
because clinical adverse events and burdens are more than benefits, that is, when 
the treatment is no longer appropriate for the improvement of the patient’s cardiac 
conditions and overall quality of life, the deactivation of the device may be consid-
ered as part of the process of care itself, letting the patient die whenever sufferings 
and pains become intolerable and excessive (Guidry-Grimes and Sederstrom 2015). 
In this sense, we might state that taking care of the patient also means stopping the 
treatment and letting death take its natural course.
Conversely, the withdrawal of a transplanted heart or the induction of its arrest 
through KCI injection might not be equivalent to LVAD withdrawal for two main 
reasons. First, the formers are considered acts that harm the patient and introduce 
a lethal pathophysiological state that interrupts the integrity of the organism. The 
technical knowledge of a physician is needed to complete the withdrawal of a trans-
planted heart or to furnish the KCI injection; in other words, the involvement of 
clinicians—directly in withdrawal, and indirectly in offering the injection—would 
contribute to realize an act against good clinical practice. In the first case, the physi-
cian would commit an act of euthanasia, while, in the second, he would set the con-
text for patient assisted suicide (PAS) would be constituted. The second aspect deals 
with the assessment of appropriateness of the right candidates for transplantation 
during the selection phase. We have already argued that with LVAD patients, the 
criterion of proportionality depends on a timeline that influences the appropriateness 
of the therapy due to clinical outcome, preferences, and burdens experienced during 
the follow up. At the end-of-life, when burdens are unbearable, futility makes the 
deactivation of the cardiac device ethically acceptable. Deactivation might be read 
as the accompaniment and the support of patient until the last step of life. Mean-
while, heart transplantation being a surgery that recreates an organic integration 
of the new organ in the organism, demands an act that harms the body, leading to 
death. There are unquestionably patients who experience follow up after transplanta-
tion with difficulties and relapses: in these complex circumstances, it is sometimes 
possible to propose another transplant, or, if that is not possible, physicians might 
continue to support and take care of the transplanted patients during the process of 
dying. In this phase, no difference exists between transplanted patients and LVAD 
ones, supported by palliative care specialists. However, there is no possibility for the 
patient to ask physicians to stop their heart. This would be an act of euthanasia.
To sum it up, a fundamental element must be highlighted to assess proportional-
ity. Patients’s preferences don’t exist on their own; other factors play a role in such 
an evaluation. This means that preferences must be evaluated considering clinical 
effectiveness too. The patient’s values and burdens must be read in the light of their 
overall clinical picture. For this reason, LVAD’s unpredictable collateral effects may 
worsen clinical conditions, causing an important impact on the patient’s preferences, 
increasing excessive and intolerable pains. These unpredictable adverse events pro-
cured by the device may influence the way in which the patient experiences the 
LVAD, that is, the way benefits and burdens are perceived. This suggests that the 
biographical lifeline of a patient with a DT LVAD, a lifeline characterized by chang-
ing burdens and benefits, might constantly be read in relation to their clinical pic-
ture—the clinical effectiveness of a treatment, since adverse clinical events are the 
major cause of the deterioration of quality of life. Thus, proportionality is a criterion 
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that must be constantly embodied in the light of the transformations of both clinical 
conditions and the impact of these factors in the subjectivity of the suffering patient.
A patient’s identity is not monolithic; it is not restricted to the mere fact of “being 
a patient”. The  LVAD produces collateral effects that could increase the sense of 
helplessness and vulnerability; however, it is fundamental for the patient to be 
accompanied by the caregiver and the clinicians in a path making him/her aware, 
whenever possible, of end-of-life alternatives in accordance to new wishes, values, 
and beliefs. LVAD deactivation may reflect one of these desires.
As the so-called “patient’s preferences” are not separated from the illness affect-
ing the patient, in the same way, clinical complications of the follow up might have 
an impact over end-of-life decisions. This explains why in critical end-of-life cir-
cumstances, if the patient expresses the desire to interrupt the LVAD therapy, clini-
cians are allowed to support such a decision, accompanying the patient to die.
Conclusion
The empowerment of medical technology leads us to reflect on its boundaries over 
human finitude. Mechanical Circulatory Supports are considered life-sustaining 
therapies for patients with advanced heart failure. The LVAD is a sustaining treat-
ment replacing left ventricle function. Stopping it would mean hastening the process 
of death. Like other life-saving technologies, e.g., mechanical ventilation, there are 
circumstances in which the treatment is no longer appropriate for the patient’s good.
Difficulties in living a “new normal” with a LVAD and collateral effects after the 
implant are well-known.
The present analysis highlights that a descriptive definition of LVAD is not 
enough to analyse the euthanasia debate. We overcome the dualistic nature of the 
various arguments, showing their ineffectiveness to address the grey scale character-
izing every human existence and dilemmatic clinical cases.
Thus, we suggest that the criterion of proportionality might constitute the nor-
mative dimension to comprehend the reasons for LVAD deactivation and its ethical 
rationale. It is fundamental to underline that the follow up of patients with a LVAD 
may worsen not only by underlying cardiac disease, but also by unforeseeable clini-
cal adverse events produced by the device implant. Proportionality helps to detect 
those variables—clinical, subjective, contextual—influencing every stakeholder’s 
life story and defining every clinical situation in order to have a better understanding 
of every one of them and their impact on the final decision. In this shared direction, 
LVAD withdrawal will represent an extreme gesture of care in order to respect the 
patient’s free decision-making process.
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